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Abstract
In this paper a computational cognitive model for intentional inhibition is introduced based on literature about intentional
inhibition, action ownership and action awareness. In this model the interplay between a positive potential selection of an action,
and the negative impacts of the same action is addressed. Performative and constitutive desires are used to differentiate the
influence for action selection and intentional inhibition with the relevant supportive states: ownership and awareness. The
introduced computational model provides a basis for application domains concerning decision making, behavioral management,
emotional control, and simulations for clinical disorders and therapies for them.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Universiti Malaysia Sarawak
Keywords: Intention inhibition, computational cognitive model, performative and constitutive desires
1. Introduction
In certain situations, it is considered that spontaneously deciding not to do a prepared action is more vital than
letting your desires and feelings govern your actions. The s to the capacity to
voluntarily suspend or inhibit an action; cf. [1-4]. An example of this (from [1]) is that you are writing an email to
your boss, and just before you click
Intentional inhibition may take place as part of the process of 
preparing for and deciding about actions to be performed. This capability is of importance for successful social
functioning. In the explanation of intentional inhibition a distinction is made between performative desires and
constitutive desires; for example, a desire to take fast food may be a performative desire whereas a desire to take
healthy food may be a constitutive desire. Actions may or may not satisfy performative desires and/or constitutive
desires. It is this difference where intentional inhibition comes in: if an action satisfies a performative desire but not
a constitutive desire, intentional inhibition may prevent the action from becoming executed.
In this paper a computational cognitive model for intentional inhibition is introduced based on literature about 
intentional inhibition, action ownership and action awareness such as [1-4]. The introduced computational model 
provides a basis for application domains concerning decision making, behavioral management, emotional control,
and simulations for clinical disorders and therapies for them.
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2. Conceptual Basis 
The notions of awareness and ownership of an action have received much attention in the recent cognitive and 
neurological literature. For example, persons suffering from schizophrenia may easily attribute self-generated 
actions to (real or imaginary) other persons. An important role both in the execution decisions for an action, and in 
its attribution, is played by the prediction and valuation of the (expected) effects of the action, based on internal 
simulation starting from the preparation of the action (e.g., [5, 6]). A related element, put forward, for example, in 
[7], is the notion of action awareness. In [8] a computational model for these processes is contributed. As shown in 
literature such as [1-4] decisions to suppress a prepared action may be based on a more complex process of 
intentional inhibition. It may well be the case that a primary valuation of the predicted effects of an action is 
considered positive so that executing the action seems justified, but in a wider context a negative valuation of 
predicted effects is obtained that still may lead to suppressing the action. Mostofsky and Simmonds [9] have 
referred this twofold phenomenon (response selection and response inhibition) as two sides of the same coin. The 
Supplementary Motor Area (SMA) within the medial wall of the frontal cortex is shown in [9] to be responsible for 
response preparation, selection, and execution. The pre-Supplementary Motor Area (pre-SMA) appeared to be 
responsible for response inhibition [9]; for example: 
hibition is viewed as a facet of response selection, such 
that response inhibition is an intentional process in which one actively selects to withhold a response while producing a goal oriented 
one (not moving). As with response selection, response inhibition therefore depends on medial frontal premotor circuits critical for 
motor response preparation, with variable roles of involvement of prefrontal circuits (as well as posterior cortical regions) necessary for 
guiding response inhibition based on the cogn  ([9], p 751) 
Haggard [6] has referred these two cases as early and late decisions about whether to act. Walsh et al. [2] have 
noted that the intentional inhibition experience will occur some hundreds of milliseconds prior to voluntary actions 
which is in line with evidence found in [10, 11]. There are also criticisms on the hypotheses that provide relevant 
brain areas which are contributing for intentional inhibition [1]. Nevertheless, much research has confirmed that 
intentional inhibition is a core phenomenon in human brain. For example, according to [4]: 
-median cortex (dFMC) in intentional inhibition of action, and its effective 
connectivity with areas involved in intention and preparation of action. We used a naturalistic task involving clear response affordances 
and impulsive actions, close to real-life experiences of action decision. dFMC was involved in intentional inhibition of such responses, 
in addition to intentional inhibition of self-generated actions reported previously. In accordance with a functional fractionation of 
intentional action by Brass and Haggard [2007], we could dissociate the area that is involved in the implementation of intentional 
inhibition (dFMC) from the area involved in the decision whether to act or not (RCZ).  ([4], p 2842) 
The importance of intentional inhibition for healthy social functioning in a society has been highlighted in [9, 12] 
and provided literature about clinical disorders with impairments in such control, like Anarchic Hand Syndrome  
[13, 14], Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) [15, 16], substance abuse, and pathological gambling. 
According to Cohen et al. [12] self-control is a wider spectrum and intentional inhibition is a key phenomenon: 
-
emotions, or desires that would otherwise inter
definition indicates, many different methods can be used to study self-control, ranging from inhibiting a motor response to regulating an 
emotion to suppressing the temptation to eat sweets. ([12], p 417). 
In the current paper this complex process involving intention inhibition is modelled. 
3. Description of the Computational Cognitive Model 
An overview of the postulated computational cognitive agent model is shown in Fig. 1 below; the state labels 
used in the model are summarized in Table 1. The proposed model consists mainly of two loops: the impact 
prediction loop [1], and the effect prediction loop (as-if body loop) [17, 18]. The impact prediction loop involves 
awareness states while the effect prediction loop mainly demonstrates unconscious behavior. In this model Prior 
Ownership and Retrospective Ownership states are considered unconscious ownership states and the Prior 
Awareness and Retrospective Awareness states as conscious ownership states.  
3.1. Inputs to the model and their representation 
The model uses three inputs: stimulus s, context c, and effect b. The stimulus s is a state associated with a 
detectable change in the bodily (e.g., self-generated facial expression) or external (e.g., emotional state of another 
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person) environment that may lead to execute an action. A context c is of a more general type of perceived 
information, not directly relating to a specific action execution. As an example, observing a fire on two collided 
vehicles can be considered a context under the assumption that agent will not react on it. However, noticing a person 
who has been taped in a vehicle which is on fire is considered a stimulus under the assumption that the agent will do 
something on this. Context c can be of different types: when the context c is self, that indicates a focus on self, 
whereas for context c an observed agent B (other), indicates focus on another person B. Effect b is the input to the 
model indicating effect of execution of an action a. The model has the ability to develop relevant prior and 
retrospective states and to communicate about ownership. 
Table 1. Nomenclature for Fig 1 
Notation Description 
WS(W) world state W (W is a context c, stimulus s, or effect b) 
SS(W) sensor state for W 
SR(W) sensory representation of W 
PA(a) preparation for action a: action a can be either objective (obj) or subjective (sub) 
F(b) feelings of action a after: effect prediction (obj) or impact prediction (sub) or action execution (obj) 
PO(a, b, c, s) prior ownership state for action a with b, c, and s 
RO(a, b, c, s) retrospective ownership state for a with b, c, and s 
EA(a) execution of action a 
EO(a, b, c, s) communication of ownership of a with b, c, and s 
PAwr(a, b, c, s) prior-awareness state for action a with b, c, and s 
RAwr(a, b, c, s) retrospective-awareness state for action a with b, c, and s 
PD(b) performative desires for b 
CD(b) constitutive desires for b  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Overview of the computational cognitive agent model 
from special doted arc [ ] it represents intentional inhibition activation 
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Inputs that are coming from world states (i.e., WS(s), WS(c), and WS(b)) lead to Sensor States SS(s), SS(c), and 
SS(b) respectively. Sensor states lead to further internal processes according to the following causal sequence [19] 
(which is referred as body loop in Fig 1): 
sensing a stimulus  sensory representation of stimulus  preparation for bodily response  
sensing the bodily response  sensory representation of the bodily response  feeling the emotion 
3.2. Effect prediction loop 
Effect prediction or as-if body loop moves from preparation for bodily response to sensory representation of the 
bodily response to feeling the associated emotion [17, 18]. The effect prediction loop contributes to action selection 
(or rejection) in a parallel fashion: PA(ai) where i goes from 1 to n. Thus an agent evaluates in parallel different 
possible actions PA(ai) for a triggered stimulus s without actually executing any of those yet. Finally the best valued 
candidate will emerge for execution and other choices naturally get diluted. Furthermore, in the valuation of the 
predicted effects the model takes into account the influence of performative desires. Performative desires are mainly 
contributing for short term interests/goals that influence either selecting or rejecting an action due to satisfactory or 
less satisfactory valuation [1]. This rejection is different from intentional inhibition [1, 3]. These desires are rapidly 
changing and having a relatively low lifespan when comparing with constitutive desires explained in the next 
section. For an example to explain performative desires: when people enjoy (regularly) burgers and soda, they 
mainly satisfy their performative desires. As another example, assume that in a conference a gentlemen asked a 
question from you which you feel as offending, triggering anger (based on performative desires), nevertheless as a 
professional you will answer that question very politely and calmly (effect of your constitutive desires). 
In the effect prediction loop, the preparation for action in objective terms PA(aobj) gets effects from the sensory 
representation of context SR(c), the sensory representation of stimulus SR(s), the performative desires PD(b) of b, 
and the feeling of effect prediction F(bobj) of action aobj. The sensory representation SR(bobj) of effect bobj gets 
effects from the preparation for action in objective terms PA(aobj), the sensory state SS(b) of executed action of a, 
and the prior ownership state for action a with b, c, and s. Here, the effect from prior ownership to sensory 
representation of effect bobj is a suppression, which contributes to dilute the state level after the action gets executed. 
The feeling of effect prediction F(bobj) of action aobj gets effects from the sensory representation SR(bobj) of effect 
bobj. Performative desires PD(b) of b gets effects from the sensory representation of context SR(c), the sensory 
representation of stimulus SR(s), and the sensory representation SR(bobj) of effect bobj. 
3.3. Body loop or action execution 
The body loop is the causal sequence presented in Section 3.1. Once the model isolated the best valued candidate 
action through the as-if body loop, the action will get executed through the body loop. The effect from sensory 
representation of effect bobj on performative desires is suppression, which contributes to dilute the performative 
desires from the effects of action execution for actions satisfying the desire. 
3.4. Impact prediction loop 
The impact prediction loop is a loop parallel to the as-if body loop and drives the person through his or her long 
term driven aspirations (referred here as constitutive desires). This makes an additional contribution to the action 
selection process by considering the (more subjective) longer term consequences and implications of the considered 
action. Through this the person can demonstrate him or herself as a person, instead of merely putting his or her 
laymen feelings into actions. Using this the person has the ability to decide whether it is required to abandon the 
action selected based on performative desires: intentional inhibition [1-4]. Intentional inhibition does not simply 
reset or drive the performative desires to a non-action situation. This phenomenon is fundamentally different from 
an action selection process in which non-action is simply another alternative [1]: unintentional inhibition occurs 
prior to conscious awareness.  
In this impact prediction loop the preparation for abandoning the action in subjective terms PA(asub) is affected 
by the sensory representation of stimulus SR(s), the feeling of effect prediction F(bobj) of action aobj, the constitutive 
desires CD(b) of b, the feeling of effect prediction F(bsub) for action asub, the prior awareness state PAwr(a,  b, c, s) 
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for action a with b, c, and s, and the retrospective awareness state RAwr(a,  b, c, s) for action a with b, c, and s. 
Having effects from prior and retrospective awareness to the preparation for abandoning the action in subjective 
terms, models the role of more conscious elements in the process [20]. The sensory representation SR(bsub) of effect 
bsub is affected by the preparation for avoiding the action in subjective terms PA(asub). The feeling of effect 
prediction F(bsub) of action asub gets effects from the sensory representation SR(bsub) of effect bsub, and constitutive 
desires CD(b). When this feeling has a high activation level, this means that the action does not satisfy the 
consitutive desire CD(b), so the preparation PA(asub) to abandon the action should become high as well. 
Constitutive desires CD(b) of b themselves get effects from the sensory representation of stimulus (SR(s)), and the 
sensory representation SR(bobj) of effect bobj. Here, the effect from sensory representation of effect bobj to 
constitutive desires is suppression, which contributes to dilute the constitutive desires from the effects of action 
execution for actions satisfying this desire. Note that actions that do satisfy the constitutive desires may well be 
different from the actions satisfying the performative desires. For example, taking fast food may satisfy the 
performative desires whereas taking healthy food may satisfy the constitutive desires. Indeed, such differences may 
serve as triggers for intentional inhibition. 
3.5. Ownership states 
This model adopts parts of the ownership-related states from cognitive agent model presented in [21]. There are 
two ownership states: the prior ownership state PO(a, b, c, s) for action a with b, c, and s, and the retrospective 
ownership state RO(a, b, c, s) for a with b, c, and s. These ownership states are mainly assumed to be unconscious 
ownership states. Prior ownership state emerges prior to the action execution where as retrospective ownership state 
is emerged precede to the action execution. The prior ownership state PO(a, b, c, s) for action a with b, c, and s 
gets effects from the sensory representation of context SR(c), the feeling of effect prediction F(bobj) of action aobj, 
the preparation for action in objective terms PA(aobj), and the retrospective ownership state RO(a,  b, c, s) for 
action a with b, c, and s. Here, the effect from the retrospective ownership state for action a with b, c, and s to the 
prior ownership state for action a with b, c, and s is a suppression, which contributes to dilute the prior awareness 
once the retrospectives awareness was developed. The retrospective ownership state RO(a,  b, c, s) for action a 
with b, c, and s gets effects from the execution EA(a) of action a, the feeling F(bobj) of the effect prediction of 
action aobj, the prior ownership state PO(a,  b, c, s) for action a with b, c, and s, the sensory representation of 
context SR(c), and the preparation for action in subjective terms PA(asub). Here, the effect from preparation for 
action in subjective terms to retrospective ownership is a suppression link. 
3.6. Awareness states 
This model adopts parts of the awareness related states from cognitive agent model presented in [8]. There are 
two awareness states: the prior awareness state PAwr(a,  b, c, s) for action a with b, c, and s, and the retrospective 
awareness state RAwr(a,  b, c, s) for a with b, c, and s. These awareness states are mainly assumed to be conscious 
ownership states. Prior awareness state precedes to the prior ownership state and retrospective awareness precedes 
to the retrospective ownership state. The prior awareness state RAwr(a,  b, c, s) for action a with b, c, and s gets 
effects from the feeling of effect prediction F(bsub) of action asub, the preparation for action in subjective terms 
PA(asub), the prior ownership state PO(a,  b, c, s) for action a with b, c, and s, the feeling F(bobj) of effect 
prediction of action aobj, and the retrospective awareness state RAwr(a,  b, c, s) for action a with b, c, and s. Lack 
of awareness of experienced feelings has shown that it may make it difficult to select the appropriate action 
selection according to the situation [22]. Here, the effect from retrospective awareness to prior awareness is a 
suppression link; so that once the retrospective awareness developed it leads to suppress the prior awareness. The 
retrospective awareness state RAwr(a,  b, c, s) for action a with b, c, and s gets effects from the feeling F(bsub) of 
effect prediction of action asub, the prior awareness state PAwr(a,  b, c, s) for action a with b, c, and s, the 
retrospective ownership state RO(a,  b, c, s) for action a with b, c, and s, and the feeling F(bobj) of effect prediction 
of action aobj. 
68   Dilhan J. Thilakarathne and Jan Treur /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  97 ( 2013 )  63 – 72 
3.7. Execution and communication states 
The execution state EA(a) of action a is the state which finally performs the action which was internally formed 
and decided upon. The main feature of this model is the causal relation from preparation for action in subjective 
terms PA(asub) to execution of action: intention inhibition [1-4]. Execution EA(a) of action a gets effects from the 
prior awareness state PAwr(a,  b, c, s) for action a with b, c, and s, the preparation for action in subjective terms 
PA(asub), the prior ownership state PO(a,  b, c, s) for action a with b, c, and s, and the preparation for action in 
objective terms PA(aobj). Communication EO(a, b, c, s) of ownership of a with b, c, and s is based on the 
capability of expressing the ownership of a selected action (when c is other and self respectively). Communication 
EO(a, b, c, s) of ownership of a with b, c, and s is affected by the retrospective awareness state RAwr(a,  b, c, s) 
for action a with b, c, and s, and the retrospective ownership state RO(a,  b, c, s) for action a with b, c, and s. 
3.8. Dynamics of the model  
Connections between state properties (the arrows in Fig 1) have weights k, as indicated in Table 2. In that the 
column LP refers to the (temporally) Local Properties listed at http://www.few.vu.nl/~dte220/ICCS13Appendix.pdf. 
A weight k has a value between -1 and 1 and may depend on the specific context c, stimulus s, action a and/or 
effect state b involved. By varying these connection strengths, different possibilities for the characteristics and 
repertoire offered by the modeled person can be realised. Note that usually weights are assumed non-negative, 
except for the inhibiting connections, such as w1, w3, w11, w25, w27, w35, w40, w42, and w45. 
The dynamics following the connections between the states in Fig 1 has been designed based on a dynamical 
systems perspective; e.g., [23]. Parameter   is a speed factor, indicating the speed by which an activation level is 
updated upon received input from other states. During processing, each state property has a strength represented by 
a real number between 0 and 1; variables V (possibly with subscripts) run over these values. In dynamic property 
specifications, this is added as a last argument to the state property expressions. Below, f is a function for which 
different choices can be made. In the example simulations, for the states affected by only one state (i.e., in LP1, 
LP2, and LP3), the function f is taken as the identity function f(W) = W, and for the other states f is a combination 
function based on the logistic threshold function as in equations (1), and (2) (for more information see [19]).  
 
f(ሻൌ      when  X > 0  (1) 
f(ሻൌͲ       when X   0  (2)   
Table 2. Overview of the connections and their weights 
from state to state weights LP 
EA(a), EA(a)body-loop, EO(a,b,c,s) WS(W) w1, w2, w3 LP1 
WS(s), WS(c), WS(b) SS(W) w4, w5, w6 LP2 
SS(s), SS(c) SR(W) w7, w8 LP3 
SS(b), PA(aobj), PO(a,b,c,s) SR(bobj) w9, w10, w11 LP4 
PA(asub) SR(bsub) w12 LP5 
SR(c), SR(s), PD(b), F(bobj) PA(aobj) w13, w14, w15, w16 LP6 
F(bsub), CD(b), SR(s), F(bobj), RAwr(a,b,c,s), PAwr(a,b,c,s) PA(asub) w17, w18, w19, w20, w21, w22 LP7 
SR(c), SR(s), SR(bobj) PD(b) w23, w24, w25 LP8 
SR(s), SR(bobj) CD(b) w26, w27 LP9 
SR(bobj), PD(b) F(bobj) w28, w29 LP10 
SR(bsub), CD(b) F(bsub) w30, w31 LP11 
SR(c), F(bobj), PA(aobj), RO(a,b,c,s) PO(a,b,c,s) w32, w33, w34, w35 LP12 
F(bsub), PA(asub), PO(a,b,c,s), F(bobj), RAwr(a,b,c,s) PAwr(a,b,c,s) w36, w37, w38, w39, w40 LP13 
PAwr(a,b,c,s), PA(asub), PO(a,b,c,s), PA(aobj) EA(a) w41, w42, w43, w44 LP14 
PA(asub), SR(c), PO(a,b,c,s), F(bobj), EA(a) RO(a,b,c,s) w45, w46, w47, w48, w49 LP15 
F(bsub), PAwr(a,b,c,s), RO(a,b,c,s), F(bobj) RAwr(a,b,c,s) w50, w51, w52, w53 LP16 
RAwr(a,b,c,s), RO(a,b,c,s) EO(a,b,c,s) w54, w55 LP17 
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4. Analysis of the Model Based on Simulation Experiments 
This section discusses simulation experiments to analyse the designed model in different scenarios. In the first 
scenario a stimulus and context lead for a prepared action that has satisfactory predicted effects, but nevertheless the 
action is not performed due to intentional inhibition. The second scenario is one in which intentional inhibition does 
not occur. For more scenarios, see at [http://www.few.vu.nl/~dte220/ICCS13Appendix.pdf]. 
4.1. Selecting values for the connection weights 
Selecting suitable weight values for connections for neurological and behavioral agent models is a specific 
nontrivial issue. To identify suitable weight values for the connections in the current model an analytically driven 
approach was used. First a set of scenarios was identified for which the outcome can be at least partially identified 
in advance based on neurological and behavioral evidence from the literature. Based on that heuristic knowledge for 
a selected scenario the weight values were calibrated to simulate a pattern as expected. Once a set of values for these 
parameters were obtained for the selected scenario, the same values were used for another scenario, for which also 
an expected pattern was identified.   
This new scenario requires changes to some parameters in order to adapt to it: for example, scenario 2 differs 
from scenario 1 only by setting values the values of w19, w20, w21, w22, w26, and w27 to 0. If the previously identified 
values provide simulation results for the new scenario as expected, then the previously obtained parameter values 
become more justified. If, in contrast, the simulation results for the new scenario are not as expected, it is required to 
change some of the selected parameter values (based on the sensitivity of certain parameters on the required final 
output) until the simulations for this new scenario give results as expected.  
If for a new scenario there are any changes to the previously obtained parameter values, then all previously 
addressed scenarios should be re-addressed. Through this iterative process after a number of cycles through a 
number of scenarios it is possible to obtain set of parameters values that are suitable for all these scenarios. During 
this iteration process, if it is performed smoothly, the required changes for the parameter values will get lower and 
lower over time, according to a converging process. 
Through the above mentioned approach the parameter values in Table 4 were obtained for the connections in the 
model. scenarios have been listed in Table 5. Furthermore; the step 
size ( ) taken is 0.25. The slow value 0.5 for   was applied for external processes modeled by LP1, and LP2, and 
the fast value 0.9 for   for the internal processes  
Table 4. Connection weight values used for cognitive agent model (Note: all blank cells hold the respective value of S1 cell of the 
respective weight). W: Weight; S: Simulation 
W w1 w2 w3 w4 w5-6 w7 w8-9 w10 w11 w12 w13-16 w17 w18 
S1 -0.5 0.8 -0.8 1 0.7 1 0.7 0.8 -0.3 1 0.7 0.9 0.9 
S2          0.1  0.1  
W w19 w20 w21-22 w23-24 w25 w26 w27 w28-29 w30 w31 w32-34 w35 w36-37 
S1 1 0.8 0.2 0.9 -0.6 1 -0.2 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 -1 0.9 
S2         0.1     
W w38-39 w40 w41 w42 w43 w44 w45 w46-48 w49 w50 w51-55   
S1 0.8 -0.8 0.6 -1 0.4 0.65 -1 0.7 1 0.9 0.8   
S2    -0.2   0.6       
Table 5.  and  
 PA(aobj) PA(asub) SR(bobj) SR(bsub) F(bobj) F(bsub) PD(b) 
Steepness  1.5 1.2 3 3 3 3 4 
Threshold  0.1 0.6 0.1 0.2 1 1 0.1 
 CD(b) PO PAwr EA(a) RO RAwr EO 
Steepness  6 6 4 6 4 8 6 
Threshold  0.3 1 0.9 1 1.8 1.35 0.7 
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4.2. Scenario 1: Satisfactory predicted action effect but intentionally inhibited action 
The first scenario, shown in Fig 2 describes a situation where the context c is self, and a stimulus s occurs. The 
predicted action effect b of a, is considered positive for the agent. Parallel to the objective prediction process, the 
subjective impact prediction process take place and leads to an intentional inhabitation. In Fig. 2 it is shown that 
(after sensing the stimulus) the agent triggers preparation of action a (in objective terms: aobj). Based on that the 
sensory representation of the predicted effect bobj of a is generated (through the as-if body loop), followed by 
activation of the feeling of bobj, also in relation to the activated performative desires for b. Next, these states 
contribute to generate activation of a prior self-ownership state. In addition to the prior self-ownership state, a prior 
self-awareness state is developing, mainly upon the formation process of (objective) effect prediction and 
(subjective) impact prediction. This development shows in the left hand side graph of Fig 2 while the right side 
graph shows the development of impact prediction. With the activated constitutive desires for b the agent activates 
preparation P(asub) for abandoning the action, and this in turn has an increasing effect on the sensory representation 
of predicted effect bsub of a, followed by the feeling F(bsub) of bsub.  
In Fig 2 it clearly shows the strength of the feeling F(bsub) of bsub over the feeling F(bobj) of bobj which 
contributed to the developed very high prior awareness. Therefore, the preparation P(asub) for abandoning the action 
is strengthened more and action execution is intentionally abandoned, as explained in [1-4]. Due to this it shows that 
there is no effect of an execution of action a (via the body loop) in positive manner via the sensory representation of 
bobj, and thus the feeling F(bobj) of bobj with sensory representation of predicted effect bobj remain at the same level 
while developing retrospective awareness. While maintaining the same level for sensory representation of predicted 
effect bobj and feeling of bobj it strengthen the idea that although the selected action was intentionally abandoned, the 
factors that contributed to the emergence of that selection will not disappear suddenly [1]. Further it is observed that 
no retrospective ownership developed. Finally, the agent communicates self-ownership about the abandoned action 
based on retrospective self-awareness. Note that when the stimulus is taken away, all activation levels will come 
down to 0 (q.v. LP1), and will come up again when the stimulus reoccurs. Aligning with the observation by Walsh 
et al. [2]; when intentional inhibition occurred an additional time has been consumed: this can be observed by 
comparing the timelines of this with Scenario 2. 
4.3. Scenario 2: Satisfactorily predicted action gets executed  
The second scenario, shown in Fig. 3 is identical to the first but intentional inhibition does not occur and the 
action is performed. It describes a situation where the context c is the agent itself, and a stimulus s occurs. The 
action effect b of a, is considered positive for the agent. Parallel to this the impact prediction process takes place 
and evaluates the appropriateness on the action selection from long term perspectives (given the constitutive 
desires). In Fig. 3 it is shown that (after sensing the stimulus) the agent triggers preparation of action aobj. Based on 
that the sensory representation of the predicted effect bobj of a is generated (through the as-if body loop) and 
followed by the feeling F(bobj) of bobj with the aid of the activated performative desire for b. Next, these states 
contribute to generate a prior self-ownership. With the prior self-ownership, prior self-awareness is also developing, 
mainly upon the formation process of (objective) effect prediction and (subjective) impact prediction. This 
development shows in the left hand side graph of the Fig. 3 while the right hand side graph of the same figure shows 
the development of impact prediction. With the activated constitutive desires for b agent strengthens preparation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Scenario 1: Satisfactorily predicted action got intentionally inhibited. Both left and right side graphs are on same simulation and have 
been presented separately to improve the readability and clarity.  
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PA(asub) for abandoning action a. However, in the valuation process through the impact prediction link it turns out 
the impact of action a is valued as not negative (the values of SR(bsub) and F(bsub) stay low). This low level not 
contribute positively to the preparation PA(asub) for abandoning action a. This preparation has not gone to the 
activation level high enough to enable intentional inhibition. Therefore, agent performs the actual execution of 
action a which propagates its effects through the body loop [cf. 24, 25]. In Fig. 3 it clearly shows that the execution 
of action a (via the body loop) also affects in positive manner via the sensory representation SR(bobj)  and the 
feeling F(bobj)  of bobj: the sensory representation of b gets further strengthen from action execution. In parallel the 
sensory representation bobj is suppressed due to the prior self-ownership state which causes a slight dip in the graph 
[cf. 26, 27]. Due to the action execution the agent develops a retrospective self-ownership state which is followed by 
a retrospective self-awareness state and communication about it. 
5. Discussion 
 The agent model presented here was inspired by cognitive and neurological evidences, and has shown the 
combined impact from intentional inhibition, action awareness, and action ownership. The intentional inhibition 
provides a core capability to demonstrate self-control in a situational context that confirms a surviving 
more, in parallel to the positive action selection process, the intentional inhibition process evaluates 
the possible negative influence of the current action selection from the long term perspective and may lead to 
abandoning the action .  The awareness both prior and retrospective to the execution of the action contributes to the 
intentional inhibition from a conscious perspective while ownership from both prior and retrospect to the execution 
of the action contributes to action forming process from an unconscious perspective. This interplay between 
conscious and unconscious processes is emphasized in [6, 28-31]. 
The simulation results are in line with the literature discussed in Section 2 and 3. The experiments have 
highlighted the fact that if intentionally an action was abandoned it takes relatively more time to get settled with the 
original feelings compared to the same when the action got successfully executed (see Scenario 1 and 2). The 
Anarchic Hand Syndrome (AHS) is a neurological disorder [1] that can be simulated analogically by considering 
Scenario 1 and 2 also.  
The agent model is meant as a basis for subsequent work on developing ambient agent systems able to monitor, 
analyse and support persons trying to develop a healthy lifestyle. If such systems have such a model of the 
underlying human processes, they can use this to have a more deep understanding of the human. As possible 
application domains the following will be addressed: decision making, behavioral management, emotional control, 
and simulations for clinical disorders and therapies for them. Similar to the intentional inhibition there is interesting 
literature evidence available on emotional influence on action inhibition and selection for better self sustainability 
and non social dysfunction [ex. 32].  
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